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In the

Supreme Cow1 of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST
of

Case No.
9003

CHARLYNE FRANCIS MITCHELL,
Minor.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT
As used in this brief, unless. otherwise indicated, the
term (THE COURT) refers to The First District Juvenile
Court of Weber County, Utah: the initial (R) refers to the
Record on Appeal; the initial (T) refers to the Transcript
of the testimony, and the initials (CR) refer to the Confidential Reports.
Shirley Mitchell Holland is a young woman that lived
in Ogden, Utah, who had three children, two girls and a
boy, all apparently born out of wedlock. The boy is with
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its father in the State of Pennsylvania and is not involved
in this proceeding. The two girls, Sharon, age 6, and
Charlyne Francis, age 5, were kept by the mother in Ogden.
!n June, 1957 Sharon was brought under the jurisdiction
of the Court and placed under the supervision of the Welfare Department but custody remained with the mother.
In January or February, 1956, the mother gave Charlyne to John Stelly and his wife, Berth, ostensibly for the
purpose of adoption. The Stellys did not adopt Charlyne, as
will .more fully appear in this brief.
On July 25th, 1958 a Probation Officer filed Petitions
with the Court, R-7 and R-22, alleging that these girls were
neglected children and praying that they be placed for
adoption. Notice was served on all interested parties and
hearings were held, commencing August 26, 1958 and concluded December lOth, 1958.· At the conclusion of these
hearings the court dismissed the petition as to Sharon and
returned her to the custody of her mother, but found the
mother unfit to have the custody of Charlyne and awarded
her to the custody of the Stellys for the purpose of adoption.
To reverse the ruling in regard to Charlyne, the mother
and her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Coy Pruitt, prosecute this
appeal and make the following assignment of errors:
1. Misconduct of the Welfare Officers by which appellants were prevented from having a fair trial.

2. Error of the Court in assuming jurisdiction over
these children.
3. Error of the Court in depriving the mother of cus. tody of Charlyne Francis.
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4. Error of the Court in awarding custody of said
~hild to John Stelly and his wife, Berth Stelly, with the
right of adoption.
To sustain this appeal and reverse the trial Court,
appellants rely on the following:

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON
THE JUVENILE COURT.
POINT II.
THEJUDGMENTISCONTRARYTOTHEEV~

DENCE.
POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PETITION DOES NOT ALLEGE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON
THE JUVENILE COURT.

State in Interest of Johnson, 175 P. 2nd 486;
Label vs. Sullivan, 165 S. W. 2nd 639;
State in Interest of Graham, 170 P. 2nd 172;
In Re Cranjaeger, 140 N. E. 2nd 773.
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In construing our statutes conferring jurisdiction on
Juvenile Courts to protect children, this Court in the Johnson case, at page 490, Pacific citation, said:
"We recognize of course that there may be circumstances where a failure to take control of a child
may do the child immediate injustice, such as contemplated in the statute. Under such circumstances
the juvenile authorities should act swiftly and effectively.
"Our juvenile court procedure is sufficiently
flexible to protect a child in an emergency against
ill treatment, abuse, or injury to health or moralswhere immediate and summary action is required.
(Statute quoted.)
"However, throughout the juvenile code repeated
warnings are given as to the preferential rights of
the natural parent, and of course these emergency
provisions are not intended as a convenient vehicle
for nullifying that preference. This was not an
emergency case. It was nothing more than an effort
to show that the mother of the child was not a suitable or proper person to have the custody of her
child-an issue that could have been tried in the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings without resort to the emergency proceedings such as were taken
here. The petition alleges no fact of an emergency
nature."

Label vs. Sullivan is a Missouri case wherein it is said:
"In order to justify committing minors to charitable institutions because of neglect of its parents
as alleged in the complaint means that parent had
failed to provide for children in such manner and to
such extent as to make him a neglected child within
the statute, that is, destitute or dependent on the
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public for support, so as to give Juvenile Court jurisdiction of a cause which would not be supplied be
entendment where the Court's findings were broader
than the statute."
In New Hampshire the rule is stated as follows:
"The jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court is limited to neglected and dependent children, a neglected
child being one who is abandoned by his parents, who
habitually begs or receives alms, who is found in any
disreputable place; associates with disreputable persons ; engages in an occupation or is in such surroundings as may prove injurious to the child's physical, mental or moral well being." Label vs. Sullivan,
supra.
In Ohio the rule is stated with this language:
"Where a mother of minors was confined to
state hospital because of mental illness, and during
her confinement she had no funds with which to
support her children and was unaware of their
whereabouts, she was not guilty of wilfull neglect
and the children did not come within the statutory
definition of a neglected child whose custody could
be awarded to the Child Welfare Board." Re, Granjaeger, supra.
No such state of affairs is alleged in the case at bar.
Now, let's examine the petition in this cause R-22; It
alleges; (1) that the parents are not married. This does not
bring the child within our statute. (2) The father abandoned the mother and child. Nor does this. (3) The mother
placed the child with John Stelly. This is an allegation of
care, not neglect. ( 4) The mother had not provided any
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support. Here there is no allegation of wilfullness. or ability
on the part of the mother. There is no allegation of emergency, on the part of the child, such as suggested by the decisions. cited herein. The Record shows affirmatively that
the child, as a matter of fact, was well cared for and no
emergency existed. In this, we respectfully submit that the
Petition alleges no fact sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the Court.
In the Johnson case this Court held that, independent
of some emergency giving the Court jurisdiction, Juvenile
Courts have no jurisdiction to determine fitness of parents
to have custody of their children. But notwithstanding the
absence of any allegation in the petition as to the fitness
of the mother, the Court found the mother to be unfit as to
Charlyne, R-9, but denied relief as to Sharon, R-5, T-16.
Here we challenge the State and counsel for the Stellys to
reconcile these inconsistent findings. By what stretch of the
imagination can it be said that a mother is a fit person to
have the custody of one small child and unfit to have the
custody of the other?
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

State in Interest of Johnson, 175 P. 2nd 486;
State in Interest of Graham, 170 P. 2nd 172;
In Re Masters, 137 N. E. 2nd 752;
Label vs. Sullivan, 165 S. W. 2nd 639;
In Re Knight, 31 So. 2nd 825;
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Hydock vs. Greenberg, 79 N. Y. S. 2nd 389;
In re Galleher, 84 P. 352.
Assuming the petition was sufficient to justify inquiry,
h.e evidence is totally insufficient to sustain jurisdiction.
The substance of the evidence is to the effect that the
has been in ill health for several years prior to the
ommencement of this proceeding and the Confidential ReIOrts suggest that she is mentally ill, see page 2 L. R. Royance Report and last paragraph, page 2, California Report.
~hus, under the decisions cited above, there is no basis for
lepriving the mother of her child on this ground.
::~.other

Assuming, but not admitting, that the Court had jursdiction, it is the position of appellants that the evidence
loes not disclose any neglect of Char lyne on the part of the
nother. The undisputed evidence is that the mother placed
he child with the Stellys for the purpose of adoption, T -8.
rhough it does not appear in the Record, counsel for the
:;tellys stated that the placement was made in his Office
md that the mother signed a consent and waiver under oath,
riving this child to the Stellys, CR-23. Such a consignment,
n legal effect, is void.
"Document signed by mother of minor child
born out of wedlock, reciting delivery of child to
named physician to be delivered for adoption and
that mother would execute formal papers necessary
and appear before Surrogate Court when required,
was insufficient to constitute a consent to adoption
or render mother's consent thereto unnecessary under Domestic Relations Law, since named physician
was not an authorized agency under Social Welfare
Law to which child could be surrendered for purpose
of adoption." Hydock vs. Greenberg, supra.
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Syllabus 3 and 4 of the Galleher case reads as follows:
"3. An oral agreement, by which a father gave
his child, when six months of age, to the child's maternal aunt to raise, was revocable at the father's
election."
"4. In a proceeding for the appointment of a
guardian for a child under 14 years of age, evidence
held insufficient to warrant a finding that the child's
father, who applied for the child's custody, had either
deserted or abandoned the child, or that he was profligate, indolent, intemperate, and an improper person to be awarded such custody."
Utah statutes require waivers be made to licensed Child
Welfare agencies.
Notwithstanding the legal effect of this placement, the
mother acted in good faith and expected that the child would
be adopted and had no reason to suspect otherwise until
two years later when she was hailed into court accused of
neglect. The Stellys did not keep faith with the mother.
They found themselves unable to adopt the child, or otherwise provide for it, and instead of returning it to its mother,
they, undoubtedly, sought relief from the Welfare Department and thus brought the matter to the attention of the
Court. During the period that the Stellys had cusody of this
child, the mother's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Pruitt, contributed nearly $2,000.00 towards the support of these two
children, T-16 to 18, and if there was any neglect on the par
of any one that neglect came from the Stellys. There is n
evidence in the entire Record showing, or tending to sho"
that this child ever, at any time, lacked the common necess]
ties of life. And in this v.re respectfully submit that the jud~
ment is contrary to the evidence.
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POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cases above cited;
Hydock vs. Greenberg, 79 N.Y. S. 2nd 389.
On October 7th the Court granted counsel access to
the Social files for the purpose of examination, R-12, T -23.
During the interim counsel made several calls at the Clerk's
Office to see these reports but the Welfare Departments did
not file them until the case was called for hearing
December lOth at 1 :30 p. m., see reports. After Court was
in session the Judge recessed for ten minutes to allow
counsel an opportunity to examine the reports, T -24. On
the morning of December lOth counsel visited the Office
of the Welfare Department in Ogden for the purpose of
examining these reports but was refused access to them on
the ground that they had not been filed with the Court and
in this we respectfully submit that such conduct did not
allow counsel a reasonable opportunity to be prepared to
meet the contents thereof and, therefore, constituted misconduct prejudicial to the interest of appellants, and reversible error.
Assuming, but not conceding, that the Court had jurisdiction, and assuming further, but not conceding, that the
Court was justified in depriving the mother of custody, it
is the position of appellants that the judgment is contrary
to the best interest of the child.
As pointed out by this Court in the Johnson case, the
Juvenile Code is not intended as a convenient vehicle to
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nullify the preferential rights of parents to the custody of
their children. When the Stellys failed to carry out their
end of the bargain and adopt this child, the right to the
custody of that child reverted to the mother and upon learning of the ill treatment her children had received at the
hands of the SteUys, it was her desire that her parents
should have the children, T-9, 10.
The grandparents filed an application with the Court,
R-14, 15, and thus, so far as the best interest of the children
was concerned, there was a contest between the Stelly and
Pruitt homes.
As between these two homes the record discloses that
the Stellys were not able to pay the nominal expenses of
adopting the child, CR-23. The only apparent reason for this
case being before the Court was the inability of the Stellys
to provide for the child. The Confidential Reports reflect
cruel and harsh beatings inflicted on Charlyne by Mrs.
Stelly and at T-32 it is revealed that Charlyne suffered a
fractured hip with no explanation as to how the child happened to fall. Could the child have broken her hip in trying
to escape a beating from Mrs. Stelly?
The Wright report shows that Mr. Stelly was addicted
to intoxicating liquor but suggests that he has joined the
church and his Pastor feels that he will straighten up and
be all right. There is nothing in the report that shows when
Mr. Stelly joined the church or that he has, in fact, quit
drinking liquor. Thus we may assume that he joined the
church subsequent to the commencement of this proceeding
for the purpose of influencing its outcome rather than concern for his own soul. Another factor worthy of considera-
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tion is the fact that not once, during the entire proceedings,
did the Stellys appear in court and present themselves for
examination and cross-examination concerning their treatment of the children and their fitness and ability to support
them, but, like Peter, when his Lord was on trial for His
life, they stood afar off, R-12, watching to see what happened but afraid to let their presence be known.
On the other hand we have the Pruitts present at every
hearing; concerned about the welfare of their grandchildren; presenting themselves to the scrutiny of the Court
and subjecting themselves to cross examination and showing their stake in the support of these children and ability
to provide for their future; they own their own home and
contemplate buying another; they have permanent employment with a monthly income of upward of $800.00 and, if
need be, Mrs. Pruitt is willing to give up her employment
and devote full time to the rearing of these children and
still have more than $500.00 monthly income. The only
objections voiced against the Pruitts is the feeling of welfare workers that they were not interested in adopting the
children but only wished to restore them to their mother.
Donald DeWitt, T-21, suggests that because Shirley (the
daughter) has had her problems which her parents did not
solve, that they, (the Pruitts) would not be able to properly
raise these children. It does not take an expert to know,
because it is a matter of common knowledge, that Black
Sheep often appear in the best regulated families. These
innuendos and insinuations are rebutted by sworn testimony
in open court, T-30.
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Looking at it from the standpoint of the children themselves, who are innocent victims of circumstances over
which they had no control and for which they are in no way
responsible, it is the position of appellants that the natural
right of these children to the love, affection and welfare
of each other, as sisters, transcends the desires, wishes and
feelings of all the parties to this proceeding and in this we
respectfully submit that it is the duty of the Court to respect
the rights of these innocent children, of such tender years,
by keeping them together in one family. As the record now
stands before this Court it is quite apparent that the Pruitt
home is a more suitable P.lace to subserve this purpose.
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CONCLUSION
We have pointed out herein the failure of the Petition
to allege facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court; we have shown that the evidence is insufficient
to confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court; we have shown
that no emergency existed as contemplated by statutes, and
wherein the judgments of the Court can not be reconciled
with each other. As to fitness of the mother, we have· cited
the decisions of this Court holding that the fitness of parents to have the custody of their children is an issue triable in courts of general jurisdiction where the parties concerned may face each other face to face, introduce competent evidence, examine and cross examine witnesses and the
court determine the issues on facts rather than assumptions,
feelings and hearsay. We have pointed out wherein the
interest of the children themselves was not given proper
consideration, and in this we respectfully submit that the
judgment of the Juvenile Court should be reversed and remanded with costs to appellants.

Respectfully submitted,
D. H. OLIVER,
Attorney for Appellants.

524 Beason Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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